The empirical literature on corruption has identified consequences of corruption for countries, such as lower growth and foreign direct investment, 1 and causes of corruption across countries, such as the legal, political and fiscal systems. 2 It has made progress in suggesting remedies for corruption: some papers infer corrupt practices in particular industries, and examine how rule changes or audits affect business practices. 3 In this paper, I contribute to a nascent empirical literature that seeks to understand bilateral interactions between public officials and clients as a stepping stone to devising policy. 4 I do so by studying bribery in health care in Peru and Uganda, with particular emphasis on the role of household permanent income in determining who bribes and how much.
In earlier work, Hunt and Laszlo (2007) analyzed bribery mechanisms for samples pooling all institutions in Uganda and Peru, and found similar results for the two countries.
The health sector is worthy of separate study for several reasons. First, mechanisms could differ across institutions, and different mechanisms may require different solutions.
Unlike many public institutions, the public health care system has competition from the private sector, which could influence bribery mechanisms. Second, the health sector is one where equitable access, and hence the link between permanent income and bribery, is of particular concern. Third, this is a sector where differences between Peru and Uganda might be expected, as health care is relatively free of bribery in Peru, while it has a bribery rate close to average for the public sector in Uganda. Fourth, for Uganda, a comparison between bribery in the public and private health care systems may be made.
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Finally, the data for both countries allow a richer set of covariates to be used in the study of health care than could be used with other institutions. The comparison of Peru and Uganda is instructive because Peru is a middle-ranking country in Transparency
International's Corruption Perceptions Index, with a GNI per capita of US$5,830, while 1 Uganda is classified as one of the most corrupt countries by TI and has a GNI per capita of only US$1,500.
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Theory suggests that richer clients should be more likely to bribe a public official, and should pay more conditional on bribing. This stems from the official's possessing a degree of monopoly power, and hence the ability to price-discriminate amongst customers. If such discrimination is observed, it could reflect first-degree price discrimination, or, if the exact service being paid for by the client cannot be observed, third-degree price discrimination (the rich pay more and get more). Greater competition between service providers, whether private or public, should reduce the ability of officials to price discriminate, and indeed, under perfect competition bribe amounts should be bid down to zero. Lewis (2006) has proposed that infrequent bribery in health care in certain countries, including Peru, is explained by the presence of private sector competition in those countries.
As expected, I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery probability by 0.2-0.4 percentage points in Peru, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%; doubling household expenditure in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points compared to a bribery rate of 17%. The absolute effect is therefore larger in Uganda, but the percent effect is larger in Peru. More intriguing is the fact that the probability of bribing in the Ugandan private sector is unrelated to household expenditure. The income elasticity of the bribe amount cannot be precisely estimated in Peru, but is about 0.37 in the public sector in Uganda: the rich pay more, but pay a smaller share of their expenditure. This elasticity is the same as that for official payments in both the public and the private sector. This could be a coincidence, or could indicate that in all three cases the elasticity is determined by the same combination of fee-for-service (and the rich demanding more expensive services) and price-discrimination. Private sector bribe amounts are determined differently, since the income (expenditure) elasticity is only 0.15.
Although in Peru, particularly, bribery rates and amounts are lower in health care than in other public institutions, I do not find evidence that the public health care system in either Peru or Uganda is able to price-discriminate less effectively than other public institutions. This somewhat crude test of whether competition reduces bribery therefore fails to support the hypothesis.
Bribes in the Ugandan public sector are disproportionately paid by the richer patients amongst those not paying official fees. The results, combined with anecdotal evidence, suggest that much public sector bribery represents a facility-level extortion policy to raise revenue from patients exempted from payment by government policy. Bribes in the private sector are flat-rate fees paid almost exclusively by patients not paying official fees. It is unclear whether private patients pay voluntarily to avoid official fees, or whether exempted patients are extorted to raise revenue as in the public sector.
1 Health, Health Care and Corruption in Peru and Uganda
Health and Health Care
As would be expected given the differences in economic development, health outcomes and health care quality are very different in Peru and Uganda. Peru, the public sector accounts for 51% of hospitals, 69% of health centers and 99% of 7 Uganda Investment Authority www.ugandainvest.com/health.htm. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) outline the post-colonial history of private and public health care in Uganda.
health posts.
8 My Peruvian data, described below, indicate that for people of all ages, 44% have some type of health insurance (children are much more likely than adults to be insured, thanks to subsidized insurance), whereas in Uganda health insurance is essentially nonexistent. 9 At least in the early days of the Peruvian insurance expansion, poor uninsured patients benefited from reduced fees or exemptions from fees. 10 In Uganda during the period relevant for my data, health care at public facilities below the hospital level was free, while in public hospitals fees were based on the patient's ability to pay. 11 Although NGO and mission hospitals also make provision for fee exemptions for the poor, Amone et al. (2005) observe that in their sample of Catholic hospitals, only a minority of exempted patients were poor (the others were predominantly hospital and church staff, and teachers and pupils of the Catholic school). Most of these hospitals charged on a fee-for-service basis (each service had an associated fee), with the exception of treatment for tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, which was funded by the government. 
Corruption in Health Care
Complaints about corruption in hospitals in Peru include staff charging patients more than official prices and pocketing the difference, collusion between hospital staff and external pharmacies or external providers of medical tests, high absenteeism on the part of doctors with a second job in the private sector, doctors referring patients to their private practice, and bribes of money or sex to obtain jobs. 13 Concerning corruption that would for exemptions from fees, and charge for the certificate of exemption.
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As part of the collection of the Ugandan data, described below, the consulting company commissioned by the government ran focus groups on bribery and availability of public services in 180 villages. Almost every focus group notes that medical attention at public hospitals and health units can only be obtained in exchange for payment despite the official abolition of user fees at health units. They state that patients have to bribe to attract the attention of medical staff and pay for all medical supplies, no matter how small. 16 The impression conveyed by the focus groups is less one of individual bad apples within a particular facility than of facility-wide policies to extort bribes.
Focus group participants complain that the only drug available at Ugandan health facilities is Panadol (Tylenol). Other drugs must be purchased at pharmacies, drug shops or private practices with connections to the doctor recommending the drug, despite the fact that they should be available free in the public health units. 17 Some groups note that the corruption and poor service in the public health sector lead people to use private clinics, despite their cost.
It is possible that the abolition of Ugandan user fees shortly before my study period led health workers to extract more bribes as a way of allocating scarce resources and The health module of the survey asks each adult (and an adult proxy for children) questions about their health and hospital use in the previous twelve months, as well as more detailed questions about the previous three months and four weeks. I also use responses to questions in the bribery module about ill fortune the household has met with in the previous twelve months, especially whether someone in the household had had an accident or had been seriously ill. I also identify households with babies born in the previous twelve months. The Data Appendix provides further information.
Uganda
I use information on the 12,000 household respondents to the Ugandan Second National Integrity Survey, which over-sampled urban areas. The Ugandan government commis- A disadvantage of using the health module is that, unlike in the main bribery module, the respondent is not asked if s/he received a receipt for payment.
There are fewer non-corruption variables in this survey than in the Peruvian surveys,
and missing values, zeroes and not applicable responses cannot always be distinguished.
Household expenditure is elicited through six questions pertaining to the previous week, and three questions pertaining to the previous month, and is hence rather crudely measured. The question on bribe payments does not seem designed to elicit the value of in-kind payments. The Data Appendix provides further information. 
Samples and descriptive statistics
I restrict my analysis to households who report using the health care system in the relevant time frame. For Uganda, this means those reporting usage in the health bribery module.
For Peru, this means those who report using state hospitals in the bribery module, since it is only for them that bribery information is available.
A to deal with the fundamental selection problem, however. Table 2 shows that 12,262 of 36,000 Peruvian households reported using state hospitals (in the bribery module), and of these 0.8% reported paying or refusing to pay a bribe (a bribery "episode"), below the 2.3% bribery rate for users of all 21 official types. The number of bribery episodes in the sample is therefore only 95. Average household monthly consumption is US$339, but households with a bribery episode are richer, at US$385. The table also shows the shares of households who had suffered a misfortune, such as a serious illness or accident of one of its members, and shows such victims are over-represented amongst households with a bribery episode. The average bribe for bribers was US$9.10, which is below the (unreported) average bribe across all institutions of $20. The lower than average bribery rate and amount are consistent with reduced corruption in health care through competition with the private sector. Table 3 shows means of variables from the Peruvian health module for the same sample.
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The means are of responses to questions asked of all respondents, and the values are for the respondent to the bribery module. When these variables are used as covariates in bribery regressions, the matching will introduce measurement error, as the bribery respondent is not necessarily the household member whose visit led to the behavior reported in the bribery module. Three quarters of respondents have no health insurance and a quarter have a chronic health condition, and both groups are over-represented amongst households with a bribery episode. The 9% of people hospitalized in the previous twelve months represent 18% of households with a bribery episode. The other variables refer to windows of less than twelve months, which means that they can control only imperfectly for events in the twelve month window relevant for bribery.
I present means of further health module variables in I analyze Ugandan patients in the public sector and the private sector separately.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the 17% bribery rate for the public sector (panel A) is an order of magnitude larger than the Peruvian rate (0.8%) despite being based on the most recent visit in the past three months, rather than on all visits in the previous twelve months. 20 Panel B considers patients of Ugandan public hospitals, to make the sample comparable to the Peruvian sample, but the bribery rate is similar to the overall public rate, at 19%. The private bribery rate is lower, at 11% (panel C). In column 2 I show the share of patients who made official payments: 38% of public patients do so, but almost all private patients (83%) do so. The amount of the bribes averaged US$6.06 in the public sector, US$7.88 in public hospitals and is lower at US$5.26 in the private sector. Official payments, for those paying, are likewise highest at public hospitals, at US$15.81. For the public sector, the bribery rate is slightly below the bribery rate for all institutions together (20%) and the bribe amount is also lower compared to the average bribe of $13.
This could be a sign that competition from the private sector reduces corruption in public health care, although the difference is less pronounced than for Peru. Table 6 contains the means of variables from the Ugandan health module (additional means are in Appendix Tables 2 and 3 ). Uganda is much poorer than Peru, and patients of the public sector (columns 1 and 2) are slightly poorer than patients of the private sector (columns 3 and 4). Public sector patients who did not bribe had only US$82 in monthly household expenditure, while public sector bribers had higher expenditure at US$91. Private sector bribers are not richer than other private sector patients. In each column, at least 62% of patients suffered from malaria/fever/headache. Slightly more than half of public patients visited a hospital, while this share was low for private patients:
14% for non-bribers and 6% for bribers (though private clinics perform many functions of a hospital).
Estimation
My first outcome of interest is the probability that household i bribes conditional on using the health system, P (B|U ). I estimate
where W i is household consumption (Peru) or expenditure (Uganda), and X i are other covariates. I estimate this using a probit for Uganda and linear probability for Peru, where the small number of bribes and the large number of categorical covariates makes estimation by probit difficult.
My second outcome of interest is the amount of the bribe A. Using the sample of bribes, I estimate
For Uganda, I estimate both equations separately for users of the private and public Table 7 presents coefficients from linear probability regressions for the probability of The patients paying bribes and the patients making official payments are to a large degree different people, as Table 9 indicates. In the public sector, while 22% of those making no official payment bribe, only 8% of those making an official payment bribe, and 81% of bribes are paid by patients not making an official payment. The contrast is even greater in the private sector: fully 55% of the small number of patients making no official payment bribe, while only 2% of patients who make an official payment bribe, and 83% of bribes are paid by patients not making an official payment. The strong negative correlation between paying bribes and making official payments holds up for both sectors in regressions with the controls used in Table 8 . When the bribery regressions of panel A in Table 8 are repeated for samples of patients not paying official fees, the marginal effects are larger for the public sector (though not significantly so), and remain insignificant for the private sector (these results are not reported).
Results

Probability of bribing
It is possible that people bribe to avoid official payments: one focus group mentioned this, although the bribe in question was paid to the local government official issuing the exemption certificate. However, most of the public sector bribes mentioned in the focus groups had a different purpose, which suggests that the causality may be the opposite:
health officials may attempt to extract bribes from the richer patients who need not pay 23 For official payments for which a receipt was given. The marginal effect including receiptless payments would be smaller.
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officially (because of the type of facility or because of their low income). This would be a logical fund-raising response for local public officials whose official fees are set centrally.
It is possible that local private hospitals likewise try to circumvent centrally imposed exemption policies, or that in the private sector bribes are indeed paid principally to avoid official payment (less anecdotal evidence is available on private sector bribes). Patients with respiratory and sexually transmitted diseases do not appear more likely to bribe in the regressions, suggesting the purpose of the bribes is not to raise money from patients whose care is paid for by the government (however, these patients appear more likely than malaria patients to pay official fees, raising the possibility that they are unaware their care should be free and are paying unwitting bribes). Whatever the reason for the private bribes by patients not paying official payments, the procedure differs from that in the public sector, as the richer patients are not those paying the bribes.
Amount of bribe
For Peru, (log) household consumption has an insignificant effect on the (log) amount of the bribe, but standard errors in the range 0.3-0.5 mean that little can be learned from the small Peruvian sample of bribes. In Table 10 Panel B shows that the income (expenditure) elasticity for official payments is essentially the same as for bribes in the public sector, at 0.36, while the private sector elasticity for official payments is much higher than for private bribes, at 0.38. Public sector bribes, public sector official fees, and private sector official fees are extracted from payers in the same way based on their expenditure. Only private sector bribes are extracted differently, and are closer to a flat-rate fee.
Discussion of Ugandan results
Together, Tables 8-10 suggest the following characterization of payments for health care in Uganda. In the public sector, richer patients are considerably more likely to make official payments, presumably in part because of official policies charging patients according to ability to pay, and in part because richer patients demand more of services that are not free. However, some rich patients are using free services, and some poorer patients not making official payments are willing to pay non-zero amounts, so health facilities are able to induce these patients, particularly the richer ones, to make unofficial payments. The income (expenditure) elasticity for the bribe amounts is the same as for official payment amounts.
The private sector differs in that almost everyone makes an official payment, exemptions are not based on household expenditure, and bribes appear to be flat fees assessed on the exempted. However, the income elasticity for official payment amounts is the same as for official payments and bribes in the public sector. This could be a coincidence, or could indicate that in all three cases the elasticity is determined by the same combination of feefor-service (and the rich demanding more expensive services) and price-discrimination.
Anecdotal evidence indicating that public sector bribes often consist of paying for supplies is consistent with an important role for fee-for-service bribes.
If private-sector health facilities operate in more competitive environments than public facilities, this would be an explanation for less frequent and lower-value private-sector bribes, as well as the inability of the private facilities to price discriminate in bribes. However, the ability to price discriminate also depends on how well staff can judge patients' ability to pay, which is in turn influenced by staff turnover, the distance patients travel to the hospital and procedures for assessing patient eligibility for official fee exemptions.
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A priori it is unclear whether private or public staff know their patients better.
Conclusions
In both Peru and Uganda, richer patients are more likely to bribe in the public health care system. A doubling of household consumption increases the Peruvian bribery probability by 0.2-0.4 percentage points, compared to a bribery rate of 0.8%. A doubling of household expenditure in Uganda increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points, compared to a bribery rate of 17%, a larger absolute effect than for Peru, but smaller in percent terms. The income (expenditure) elasticity of the bribe amount is 0.37 in Uganda, and insignificant in Peru (where the sample size is very small, however). In both Peru and Uganda, the link between bribery and consumption or expenditure is similar to or higher than the link for all officials pooled, despite the presence of competition from the private sector which might be expected to weaken this link.
For Uganda, additional results combined with anecdotal evidence suggest that the public sector health staff extort bribes particularly from the richer among the patients who officially need not pay. The amount of the bribe is then influenced by household expenditure in the same way as official charges in both the public and private sector, probably through a combination of price-discrimination and fee-for-service. Although private sector bribes are even more strongly associated with not making official payments, the mechanism works differently. Those exempted in the private sector have similar household expenditures to those not exempted, and appear to pay close to a flat-rate bribe.
Data Appendix Peru -Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
The data are available at www.inei.gob.pe/srienaho/English/Consulta por Encuesta.asp. The twenty-one types of official listed in the survey are: municipal (city) government, social security (providing social insurance other than pensions), state banks, judiciary, drinking water, telephone, electricity, state schools, arbitration, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Industry, tax/customs authority, state hospitals, national civil identification registry, Department of Migration, police, electoral office, electoral court, development agency, food agency, and "other".
Uganda -Second National Integrity Survey
The survey was conducted in 55 of 56 districts of Uganda. The subsequent non-random sampling of sub-counties led to the sub-county of the district headquarters always being chosen, which means that urban areas are over-sampled. The district's sub-counties were divided into three categories based on availability of government services and infrastructure, and 20% of sub-counties in each category were randomly chosen. Within each of these sub-counties, the local council 1 areas were similarly divided into three categories, and one local council 1 area per category was chosen randomly. The selection of which households to interview within these local council 1 areas did not appear to be random, as it appeared to involve choosing households near the residence or office of the local council 1 chairperson.
It is not possible to distinguish between zeroes and missing values in the components of expenditure, so I simply assign zeroes to all missing values and sum the nine components. For seven components, most of the values are missing. In the health module, there are some valid responses for households who had not used the health care system in the previous three months: I drop these observations. Also, some households gave information on more than one health care visit in the previous three months (contrary to the survey instructions): I retain only one visit per household.
The twenty-two agencies listed in the survey are: local primary school, Department of Education, health unit, police, traffic police, local council 1, local council 3, Agriculture Department, Veterinary Department, Fisheries Department, Forestry Department, Department of Cooperatives, Public Service (pensions), Water Department, Land Board, Magistrates Court, Ugandan People's Defence Force, Local Defence Force, Uganda Revenue Authority (licencing), Uganda Revenue Authority (customs, anti-smuggling), Uganda Electricity Board and "other". However, the variable for whether or not the household used "other" officials is missing from the data I have received. Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is a household that in the bribery module reported using state hospitals. Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is a household whose respondent reported using state hospitals in the bribery module. Examples of "other medical goods/services" are thermometer, orthopedics. Possible chronic health conditions mentioned in the survey were arthritis, hypertension, asthma, rheumatism. Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is a household whose respondent reported using state hospitals in the bribery module. The symptoms dummy equals one if the respondent said s/he had "symptoms or discomfort (cough, headache, fever, nausea)". The illness dummy equals one if the respondent said s/he had "illness (flu, colitis etc)". Questions about the place where care was sought were asked of those who said they had had one of the listed health issues. Questions about health professionals and procedures were asked of those who responded that they had sought care at a health center, hospital, doctor's or clinic. More than one answer was permitted for the health professional, but I ranked them in the order given and assigned a unique indicator for the highest qualified professional the respondent saw. Additional Peruvian means are given in Appendix Table 1 . Notes: Marginal effects from probits in columns 1-3, linear probability coefficients in columns 4-6. All regressions include 54 district dummies, 13 household size dummies, and an urban dummy (basic covariates). Education is captured by dummies and job refers to dummies for respondent occupation and the main source of household income. The other non-medical covariates are the number of household males and females over 18, respondent sex, age and age squared, and status as head or spouse. The other medical covariates are the patient age, dummies for patient illness, type of facility, ongoing versus once-off treatment, and (in columns 4-6) a dummy for a mission facility. Notes: Linear probability coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include 54 district dummies, 13 household size dummies, and an urban dummy. Education is captured by dummies and job refers to dummies for respondent occupation and the main source of household income. The other non-medical covariates are the number of household males and females over 18, respondent sex, age and age squared, and status as head or spouse. The other medical covariates are the patient age, dummies for patient illness, type of facility, ongoing versus once-off treatment, and (in columns 4-6) a dummy for a mission facility.
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